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1Abstract
This paper outlines a method for detecting and assessing the strength of so-
cial interactions through a changes-in-changes design. The proposed approach
is based on a linear-in-means model and aims to resolve the “reﬂection prob-
lem”, unobserved heterogeneities and endogenous group formation that plague
identiﬁcation of social interactions. Using longitudinal data from Add Health
with rarely collected information on peer group’s composition, we explore an
exogenous variation in peer’s drug use induced by a “mover friend” that occurs
between Add Health’s survey periods. This quasi-experiment shares a similar
nature of a policy intervention of removing drug-user friends from a peer group.
Such treatment-control group diﬀerences together with changes over time form
the basis of our changes-in-changes design. Our study conﬁrms a strong en-
dogenous eﬀect, which in turn motivates a “social multiplier”, both of which
are large enough to be relevant and are well worth attention to policy makers,
researchers, health-care providers and educators for better understanding of
how to protect young people and secure our future.
Key words: social interactions, linear-in-expectations, linear-in-means, diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences, changes-in-changes.
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2It is widely believed that adolescents’ behaviors, particularly heath-related ones,
are easily inﬂuenced by others, especially by their friends, during this rapid transi-
tion period from children to adults. How do peers aﬀect one another, and why do
such inﬂuences exist? Conceptual analysis of peer eﬀects, or known as social or non-
market interactions, has been thoroughly discussed by Manski (2000) and Glaeser
and Scheinkman (2000). However, “there is little reason why a skeptic should be
persuaded to change his mind by the statistical evidence [on social interactions] cur-
rently available.” (Durlauf 2002). The weak state of empirical research on social
interactions, to a large degree, is due to a lack of adequate data.
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), a school-
based survey initiated in 1994 and by far the most comprehensive survey of adolescents
ever undertaken in the United States, collects rich data on students in grades 7
through 12 and follows them through young adulthood (Chantala, Tabor et al. 1999;
Chantala 2003). A key feature of Add Health is its precise measure of peer group
composition on individual levels, which is rarely seen in other surveys targeting youth.
Two consecutive waves of data (wave I and II) were collected between 1994 and 1996,
which is followed by a third wave ﬁve years later. This longitudinal nature provides
sources of identifying peer inﬂuences.
Using Add Health, I aim to identify and estimate peer eﬀects of adolescents’
health-related behaviors–substance use. To isolate peer eﬀects from other factors,
my identiﬁcation strategy, diﬀerent from leading alternatives, rests upon a spatial
autoregressive model (SAR, Lee 2006) and exogenous variations in peers’ behavior
triggered by a quasi-experiment–a substance user friend moving away between wave
I and II. Combining with two waves of data, I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID)
design together with its generalized version–changes-in-changes (CIC, Athey and
Imbens 2006)–to accommodate the possibility of sorting behavior–the group with
3higher expected gain receiving the treatment. The goal is to identify peer eﬀects
and treatment eﬀect under certain conditions, which can be seen correspond to an
intervention of removing of a drug-user from his or her own peer group. Identiﬁcation
of these two parameters leads to constructing a “social multiplier”, which bears rich
policy implication.
The identiﬁcation strategy, detailed below, to my knowledge, has never been used
in identifying social interactions. It disentangles peer eﬀects from sorting and un-
observed heterogeneities through the idea of DID or CIC. Its implementation hinges
upon measures of peer group’s composition, suﬃcient variations in group sizes and
data collected under a longitudinal design. All of these requirements are uniquely
met by Add Health.
First, we place the research question back to where it comes from with a more
proper framework. Adolescents spend more time with their closest friends, and these
groups are usually not big. Considering substance use, it is more likely that observed
actions of just being “cool” or actual “pursuits” of happiness seen from peers, rather
than expected behaviors, that inﬂuence individual decision-making. In this sense, the
linear-in-means model (Lee, 2006) is more appropriate and therefore adopted. This
distinguishes my study from current empirical studies on social interactions, most of
which are based on linear-in-expectations models (Manski, 1993).
Second, we utilize information of peer groups’ composition provided by Add
Health, which is rarely collected in similar longitudinal studies. We resolve the “re-
ﬂection problem” (Manski, 1993) on the basis of linear-in-means model, thanks to
the group size variations.
Third, we explore a source of exogenous changes in peers’ drug use induced by
a “mover friend” experiment occurring between Add Health’s survey periods, which
shares a similar nature of a policy intervention which removes drug-user friends from
4a peer group. Such treatment-control group diﬀerences in combination with changes
over time form the basis of a DID or CIC design.
Fourth, the “mover friend” experiment is shown to be randomly assigned condi-
tional on peer groups’ observable characteristics. This allows the use of treatment-
control group diﬀerence to purge unobserved heterogeneities on the peer group’s level.
Disentangling endogenous eﬀects from sorting and unobserved heterogeneities is re-
solved through the idea of DID or CIC.
Fifth, with the aid of this quasi-experiment, interacting the treatment group in-
dicator with time gives an estimate of average treatment eﬀect. We further relax
the mean independence (Abadie 2005) restriction implied in DID and allow diﬀer-
ent quantiles in the distribution of group unobserved heterogeneities to interact with
time. We then use CIC, and obtain estimates of average eﬀects of treatment on both
treatment and control groups, which imply a potential optimal policy intervention.
Sixth, combining CIC and DID treatment eﬀect estimates with the estimate of
endogenous eﬀects, we next quantify a “social multiplier” (Glaeser, Sacerdote et al.
2003). This is also a case of treatment with “spillover eﬀects”. We hereby attempt to
relax the stable-unit-treatment-value-assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin 1980) key to the
current treatment eﬀects literature.
Seventh, inferences on endogenous eﬀe c t sa n dv a r i o u st r e a t m e n te ﬀects are val-
idated through bootstrap, which is currently underutilized (Cameron and Trivedi
2005). We correct the size and compute the power of testing these parameters of
policy interest. We also utilize inverse power summary measure to facilitate interpre-
tation and make valid inference when tests fail to reject the null hypothesis, which
is widely neglected in applied work (Andrews 1989). This is an eﬀort to address the
weak state of inference in empirical studies (Ziliak and McCloskey 2004).
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We ﬁr s tg i v ea no v e r v i e wo fA d d
5Health study. Next, we discuss models of social interactions, identiﬁcation strategies,
estimation and inference procedures. Concluding remarks are provided in the end.
A Brief Overview of Add Health
As well noticed, the credibility of empirical studies on social interactions, to a large
extent, depends on the availability of appropriate data. It is ideal to have a wealth
of matched information on adolescents’ characteristics, school information, family
backgrounds and, most importantly, peer group composition from which we know
who interacts with whom.
Not the best, but probably better than many other alternatives or nothing, Add
Health is believed to enhance the quality of empirical research on social interactions
through a detailed measure of friend network. Add Health is a school-based study of
80 high schools and 52 middle schools sampled from the United States.
Full details on Add Health are provided by the Carolina Population Center of the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, from which the following information is
drawn.
“(Add Health) is a nationally representative study that explores the
causes of health-related behaviors of adolescents in grades 7 through 12
and their outcomes in young adulthood. Add Health seeks to examine
how social context (families, friends, peers, schools, neighborhoods, and
communities) inﬂuence adolescents’ heath and risk behaviors.”
“Initiated in 1994 under a grant from the National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development (NICHD) with co-funding from 17 other
federal agencies, Add Health is the largest, most comprehensive survey of
adolescents ever undertaken. Data at the individual, family, school, and
6community levels were collected in two waves between 1994 and 1996.
In 2001 and 2002, Add Health respondents, 18 to 26 years old, were re-
interviewed in a third wave to investigate the inﬂuence that adolescence
has on young adulthood.”
Apart from the in-school interview conducted from September 1994 to April 1995,
three waves of in-home survey data are available. A distinguishing feature of Add
Health is its information collected on peers’ network. In wave I, adolescents were
asked to nominate up to ﬁve male friends and ﬁve female friends whose identiﬁcation
numbers make it possible to construct exact and meaningful reference groups where
actual interactions occur. The wave I in-home survey collected detailed information
on illegal drug use, based on the question “during the past 30 days, how many times
did you use illegal drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, inhalants, LSD, PCP, ecstasy
and heroin”. About 14,000 adolescents were re-interviewed in wave II one year later
with nearly identical survey questionnaires. There are about 5,000 adolescents who
w e r ei n t e r v i e w e di nw a v eIn o ti nw a v eI I .T h o s ea r et h eo n e se i t h e ro v e r - s a m p l e d
in wave I (e.g., disabled or twins) or the ones who were in 12th grade in wave I and
graduated from secondary school by wave II. From August 2001 to April 2002, wave
III was conducted to re-interview all the wave I respondents who could be located,
which resulted in a sample size of over 15,000. For our empirical study, we construct
a longitudinal data set based on wave I and wave II in-home interviews including
individual’s self-reported reference group based on wave I’s in-school and in-home
interviews.
7Issues on Identifying Social Interactions
Incisively pointed by Manski (2000), social interactions, not mediated via market,
take eﬀect through two diﬀerent channels–expectation and preference. These two
channels usually intertwine with each other. Herd behaviors occur usually when
something becomes trendy or when it becomes a cheaper way to collect information.
When there is less private or less asymmetric information, social interactions are more
likely to be on the basis of aligned preferences. Inside the feedback process, and in
this sense, the size of a peer group where interactions take place plays a key role in
determining which channel will be muted. For a small group (among closest friends)
i n f o r m a t i o nt e n d st ob ec o m p l e t ea n do u t c o m e sw i t h i nag r o u pc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e d
as Nash equilibria. In contrast, loss of information will increase as the group gets
large, and expectation interactions become the dominating feature. This generates
outcomes sharing the same nature as Bayesian Nash equilibria. Therefore, whether
interactions take place on the basis of expectation or revealed preference via observed
actions leads to two types of econometric modeling–linear-in-expectations (Manski
1993; Graham and Hahn 2005) and linear-in-means (Davezies, d’Haultfoeuille et al.
2006; Lee 2006).
The linear-in-expectations model at present is still the workhorse of many empir-
ical studies. It is easy to estimate and interpret results. Apart from its emphasis
on expectation interaction, such modeling becomes appropriate when the group size
is large or the reference group can not be speciﬁed precisely. The linear-in-means
model, instead, based on a spatial autoregressive model (SAR, Lee 2006), departs
from the Manski (1993) model by measuring peer variables as spatially weighted av-
erages of observed peer outcomes and characteristics instead of expectations. It suits
small group and has some advantages over linear-in-expectation models in identifying
8social interactions. It requires information on group size, and suﬃcient variations in
the size.
Issues on identifying social interactions have been well framed, thanks to the sem-
inal work by Manski (1993). Explanation of social interactions henceforth manages
to proceed after theoretical descriptions or models. Such assessment requires diﬀer-
entiating three eﬀects, which are deﬁned by Manski (1993, pp. 532—533):
“Endogenous eﬀects, wherein the propensity of an individual to behave
in some way varies with the prevalence of that behavior in the group;
Exogenous (contextual) eﬀects, wherein the propensity of an individ-
u a lt ob e h a v ei ns o m ew a yv a r i e sw i t ht h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fb a c k g r o u n d
characteristics in the group;
Correlated eﬀects, wherein individuals in the same group tend to be-
have similarly because they have similar individual characteristics or face
similar institutional environments.”
Identifying peer eﬀects, especially disentangling endogenous eﬀects from contex-
tual and correlated eﬀects, has become the main focus on empirical studies since then.
Without direct intervention like controlled experiments, most observational studies
rely on certain natural experiments to resolve confounding factors. Such confound-
ing factors are pervasive on both group and individual level. The former creates the
“reﬂection problem” coined by Manski (1993) and group level unobserved hetero-
geneities. The latter will induce sorting behavior and endogenous group formation.
Identifying social interactions demands disentangling endogenous eﬀects from individ-
ual sorting, contextual eﬀects and unobserved group level heterogeneities (Sampson,
Morenoﬀ et al. 2002). In the case of social experiments, such as the Tennessee class
size reduction experiment Project STAR, identiﬁcation results can be robustiﬁed to
9group level heterogeneity and sorting using second-order conditional moment restric-
tions (Graham 2006). However, contextual eﬀects are still necessarily assumed away
with this excess-variance-contrasts approach.
Contextual (exogenous) v.s. endogenous eﬀects
Distinguishing contextual eﬀects from endogenous eﬀects actually have not been
confronted directly in empirical studies. Such inseparability is due to the intrin-
sic collinearity between a group averaged choice and other covariates in individual
behaviors, the so-called “reﬂection problem”, because linear-in-expectations models,
if adopted, by itself speciﬁes a group averaged outcome as a linear transformation of
group averaged characteristics. However, in discrete choice models with expectation
interactions (Brock and Durlauf 2001; Durlauf 2001; Brock and Durlauf 2002; Brock
and Durlauf 2004; Durlauf and Cohen-Cole 2004), the self-consistent expectation
formation of a group choice, featuring ﬁxed points derived from (Nash) equilibrium
conditions, grants a critical nonlinearity between group averaged characteristics and
group averaged behavior to circumvent this “reﬂection problem”. However, in these
discrete choice models with social interactions, group level heterogeneities, which
confound endogenous eﬀects as well, have not been dealt with directly. In addition,
estimating such models which imply multiple equilibria is often intractable (Bisin,
Moro et al. 2002; Cooper 2002).
The crux of identiﬁcation problems in linear-in-expectations models partially lies
in the model itself. Linear-in-expectations models treat within interactions symmet-
rically among group members. This makes it hard to simultaneously control for
group heterogeneities and group expected outcomes, which is similar to the case that
no more than one individual “ﬁxed eﬀects” can be identiﬁed in a panel setting. It
10is noticeable that introducing between-group eﬀects (Cohen-Cole 2006) may help to
overcome these obstacles, but in the meantime this approach has shifted the estimand
via including between-group complementarity, which diﬀers from the usual observa-
tion that individuals interact with one another within a group, but not with members
in other groups.
Unobserved group heterogeneities v.s. endogenous eﬀects
As Manski (1993) examines this “reﬂection problem”, it is found that identiﬁcation of
endogenous eﬀects in liner-in-expectations models is not possible unless researchers
have prior information which can specify the composition of reference groups. In
this sense, a relatively tractable question would be directed to preference interactions
within small groups where observed actions instead of their expectations generate
feedback processes. This idea is corresponding to linear-in-means models pioneered
by Lee (2006), which share the same nature as spatial autoregressive models (SAR).
The identiﬁcation is achieved in linear-in-means models through variations in known
group sizes and asymmetric responses to peers within a group given that interac-
tion is based on observed actions instead of expectation. The group size variation
here provides the crucial nonlinearity to separately identify exogenous and endoge-
nous eﬀects, and it also allows for group ﬁxed eﬀects to pick up unobserved group
heterogeneities, or termed correlated eﬀects. Explicit conditions and identiﬁcation
results in this type of models have been established in Davezies, d’Haultfoeuille et
al. (2006). And estimating these models has been discussed in Lee (2006), while
the state of art is relatively limited to parametric approach (conditional maximum
likelihood) or restricted by existence of valid instruments if semiparametric estimator
(such as two-stage least squares) is preferred.
11Although linear-in-means models enjoy certain advantages over linear-in-expectations
models, selecting between these competing models still relies on the nature of interac-
tions. If expectation interactions are the main form and even if exogenous eﬀects can
be properly excluded through quasi-experiments of sorts, identiﬁcation in linear-in-
expectations models will still be threatened by unobserved group heterogeneities. In
cross-sectional settings, we may consider a quasi-panel approach (Graham and Hahn
2005) to isolating endogenous eﬀects through excess between-group variations relative
to within-group variations. But such identiﬁcation strategy necessarily hinges upon
valid instruments to account for measurement errors that come from the gap between
expected and averaged group outcomes. The required number of instruments grows at
t h es a m er a t eo ft h en u m b e ro fg r o u p s ,s oi d e n t i ﬁc a t i o n ,i na d d i t i o n ,m a ys u ﬀer from
the many-instruments problem. Compared with cross-sectional data, panel data may
greatly facilitate identiﬁcation by allowing of time-invariant factors and providing ex-
clusion restrictions (Brock and Durlauf 2001) provided that within-group variations
are suﬃcient.
Endogenous group memberships
However, the majority of studies, both cross-sectional (Alexander, Piazza et al. 2001)
and longitudinal (Bauman, Carver et al. 2001; Haynie 2002) conclude that large en-
dogenous eﬀects are probably biased upward due to lack of control for self-selection
and unobserved individual heterogeneities. It is arguably the best way to exclude con-
founding factors is through exogenous intervention, and random assignment hereby
sets a “gold standard”. With the aid of randomization, unobservables can be purged
across groups, and sorting behavior can be avoided (Zimmerman 2003). But with
observational studies of limited sources of exogenous variations, it is diﬃcult to si-
12multaneously deal with both group and individual unobserved heterogeneities with
the latter generating endogenous group memberships.
Self-selection induces endogenous group formation (Evans, Oates et al. 1992).
The endogenous choice of residential area plagues identiﬁcation of neighborhood ef-
fects. Studies that attempt to measure the impact of neighborhoods on children’s
outcomes are susceptible to bias because families choose where to live. As a result,
the eﬀect of family unobservables, such as importance parents place on their chil-
dren’s welfare, and other unobservables that are common to geographically clustered
households, may be mistakenly attributed to neighborhood inﬂuences. To combat
such sorting behavior, panel data are often sought with various ﬁxed eﬀects having
been explored to pick up key time-invariant factors. One approach is to use a sibling
ﬁxed eﬀects model (Aaronson 1998), controlling for unobserved family characteris-
tics that inﬂuence neighborhood choices. Such sibling ﬁxed eﬀects are expected to
capture latent factors associated with neighborhood choice which do not vary across
siblings. It is hoped that family residential diﬀerences provide a source of variations
concerning neighborhood background that is free of the family-speciﬁc heterogeneity
biases associated with neighborhood selection.
If a large set of observables is available, a practical way may be just to “kitchensink”
regressions. It has been shown that standard regression models are also sensitive to
the individual and family characteristics for which one controls, with strong eﬀects
when no individual and family characteristics are controlled and smaller and often
non-signiﬁcant eﬀects when an extensive set of individual and family attributes are
controlled (Ginther, Haveman et al. 2000). Returning to panel settings, some study
(Mas and Moretti 2006) exploits ﬁxed eﬀects estimates as individual permanent char-
acteristics and sorting can be presumably excluded conditional on these permanent
characteristics. However, these nuisance parameters actually cannot be consistently
13estimated unless the time span of panel data approaches inﬁnity at a proper speed
with the cross-sectional dimension.
A recent study on endogenous memberships (Zanella 2004) allows for equilibrium
reference group formation and explores the driving force of stratiﬁed equilibria. How-
ever, such structural analyses of the reference group formation and social interactions
require either the same agents or aligned preferences, and these requirements usually
will be easily violated in parent-oﬀspring contexts.
Another problem with group memberships is that many empirical studies make
bold presumptions on group composition. Researchers know a priori the relevant
social group within which meaningful (or hypothetical) interactions take place. Iden-
tiﬁcation is essentially assumed to be obtained via diminished credibility.
Models of Social Interactions
Understanding the nature of interactions and deﬁning social reference groups are
prerequisites to analyzing peer eﬀects. Just from an identiﬁcation perspective, linear-
in-means models are preferred because of the advantages over linear-in-expectations
models in resolving the “reﬂection problem”. However, such preference should not
be reasoned only on the basis of pragmaticism. It can be shown that this choice is
actually better justiﬁed for small group interactions based upon observed actions.
To ﬁx ideas, we denote outcomes by y, individual characteristics by a vector x1,
peer group characteristics by a vector x2, peer group by r (r =1 ,···,R), size of r-th
peer group by mr, individuals in r-th peer group by i (i =1 ,···,m r), individual level
heterogeneity by a single index αri, peer group level heterogeneity by a single index
αr and idiosyncratic disturbance by  ri.
First, consider the following individual payoﬀ, additively separable in private and
14social utilities, at a given time period:
(1)
πri(yri|x1ri,y r,−i,x2r,−i,α ri,α r,m r,  ri)=u(yri|x1ri,α ri,  ri)+v(yri|yr,−i,x2r,−i,α r,−i,α r,m r)
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Next, consider employing this optimal decision rule under the following two situ-
ations.
Small group interactions with complete information
With complete information, αri, αr,−i and αr are “common knowledge” to each indi-
vidual, so αr,−i can be absorbed into αr,d e n o t e db ye αr. A Nash Equilibrium gives:
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15Equation (5) justiﬁes a linear-in-means model:














2rjλ2 + αri + e αr +  ri
Large group interactions with incomplete information
With incomplete information, αr,−i, peers’ “type” can not be directly observed,
though inferred, by each individual, while peer group’s “type” is known to each
member of the group so that αr observed. Therefore, we have the following Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium:





















Under rational expectation or self-consistency, we have:
(9) E(yri|x1ri,α ri,α r)=Er(yrj|x2rj,α rj,α r)=E(yr|xr,α r)






















E(yri|x1ri,α ri,α r)=λ0E(yr|x2r,α r)+x
0
1riλ1 + αri + E(x2r|αr)
0λ2 + e αr (11)






Equation (11) corresponds to a linear-in-expectations model:
(12) yri = λ0E(yr|x2r,α r)+x
0
1riλ1 + E(x2r|αr)
0λ2 + αri + αr +  ri
Linear-in-expectations or Linear-in-means
Place the research question back to where it comes from: adolescents spend more
time with their closest friends. Such groups are usually not big. Considering sub-
stance use, it is more likely that observed actions of “being cool” or actual pursuits
of “happiness” from peers, rather than expected behaviors, that play key roles for
individuals’ decision-making. Besides, within a small group, among closest friends,
each individual’s “type” is probably “common knowledge”. In this sense, the linear-
in-means model better accords with the nature of interaction of our interest and
therefore adopted. This distinguishes our study from current empirical studies on
social interactions, most of which use linear-in-expectations models as the workhorse.
17Empirical implication and relevance
To ﬁxi d e a s ,w ed e ﬁne some useful matrices and a vector of 1’s:





















mr (within-group operator) (15)
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A sample representation of (6) gives:
(19) yr
mr×1
= λ0Wryr + X1rλ1 + WrX2rλ2 + αr + ιmre αr + ²r




Jryr + JrX1rλ1 −
1
mr − 1















If αr can be assumed away, then this within-group operator will help to separately
identify endogenous eﬀect (λ0) and exogenous eﬀect (λ2) thanks to the nonlinearity
18built-in through variations in group sizes (Davezies, d’Haultfoeuille et al. 2006; Lee
2006). The focus on identifying λ0 is not solely for intellectual interest per se. It is
because the feedback process depends on such endogenous eﬀe c t st h a tw eh a v et h e
“leverage” to manipulate aggregate equilibrium through exogenous interventions on
individual levels. Unlike endogenous eﬀects, neither exogenous nor correlated eﬀects
generate spillover eﬀects and therefore they don’t create this “social multiplier”.






















































On a peer group level, it is clearly seen that any exogenous interventions, whose
eﬀects will be magniﬁed by 1/(1 − λ0), will possess multiplier eﬀects as long as the
endogenous eﬀect is nonzero. Suppose that there is an exogenous treatment with eﬀect
τ. Such a hypothetical “treatment eﬀect” in the presence of social interactions will be
magniﬁed to τ/(1−λ0).W ec a l lt h i ssocial multiplier of a particular intervention. It
attempts to approximate a “general equilibrium” result instead of a partial one, which
overlooks subsequent “ripple eﬀects”, and thus tends to underestimate the impacts
from the intervention if positive spillovers persist.
Identiﬁcation via linear-in-means models, although free of the “reﬂection prob-
lem”, still need to deal with unobserved heterogeneities on both individual level and
peer group level. The former induces sorting behavior, while the latter generates
correlated eﬀects (Manski 1993). Unlike studies resolving these issues through mod-
eling, we aim to address them from the research design perspective. If unobserved
19individual heterogeneities are time-invariant, then a two-period panel data can help
to “diﬀerence out” such confounding factors. And, if certain “natural” perturba-
tion occurs, generating a “treatment” group and a “control” group, then these two
groups are likely to share similar characteristics. This implies that the peer group
heterogeneities on this aggregate level can be reasonably “equalized” between treated
and untreated groups, which therefore are likely to share a similar time trend as
well. Diﬀerencing between the treated and untreated group therefore helps to purge
unobserved group heterogeneities. In the end, this DID approach will sort out the
endogenous eﬀects. And, under certain circumstances, this DID estimate can be
interpreted as the “treatment eﬀect”.
Add Health provides an excellent platform to implement this DID idea with its
longitudinal design and a “mover friend” experiment. This quasi-experiment is of
policy interest as well since it corresponds with an outside intervention of removing
a substance user from a peer group. The treatment eﬀect estimate can be further
justiﬁed under weaker conditions using a CIC approach, which obtains counterfac-
tual distributions of what would have happened in the absence or in the presence of
treatment.
Identiﬁcation
Similar to a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, we use the following linear-in-means















2rjtλ2 + αri + αrt +  rit (22)
(i =1 ,···,m r;t =0 ,1;r =1 ,···,R; E( rit)=0 ,E( rit rjt)=0 ,∀i 6= j)
20Note that the interdependence within a peer group is modeled in a “ﬁxed eﬀect”
manner. After controlling for time-invariant individual heterogeneities and peer group
time-varying heterogeneities, contemporaneous correlations across members in the
same peer group vanish, namely no random eﬀects. The trade-oﬀ between this second-
order heterogeneity and the ﬁrst-order one is currently ignored in this article.
Given the econometric model (22). We need to address two identiﬁcation prob-
lems: (1) endogenous group membership due to personal preference αri,w h i c hi s
assumed time-invariant. This implies that individual preference for joining a certain
group is stable over time; (2) peer group-level unobserved heterogeneity αrt,w h i c h
is allowed to be time-varying. This implies that the “correlated” eﬀects can change
over time.
Given the existence of time-invariant factors, a natural starting point is to diﬀer-
ence out these nuisance parameters. Diﬀerencing (22) gives:














2rjλ2 + 4αr + 4 ri
All structural parameters in this “diﬀerenced” model are generically identiﬁable
under regularity conditions explicitly summarized by Davezies, d’Haultfoeuille et al.
(2006). Estimation can be done by applying a “within-group” estimator to (23) with
both parametric (conditional maximum likelihood, CML) and semiparametric (two-
stage least squares, 2SLS) techniques. However, these proposals given by Lee (2006)
still rely heavily on distributional assumptions in addition to the functional form
restriction of the present econometric model and availability of valid instruments.
The CML enjoys the eﬃciency in terms of the Cramer-Rao lower bound but less
robust, while 2SLS essentially changes the estimand in the presence of heterogeneous
responses to instruments.
21Rather than seeking a mechanical way or an omnibus tool to solve this problem,
we exploit a “natural” experiment which provides critical exclusion restrictions by
way of a treatment-control comparison. These two “naturally” generated groups are
likely to experience similar time trend if such an intervention comes in exogenously. In
this sense, 4αr can be purged out through the treatment-control diﬀerence under this
“common trend” assumption. Therefore, we are just implementing a DID idea using
time-diﬀerencing to exclude individual unobserved heterogeneity (a normalized single
index) and treatment-control diﬀerencing to impose another exclusion restriction on
peer group heterogeneities.
In the context of Add Health, we consider this quasi-experiment when a substance
user friend moved away from his or her peer group between wave I and wave II, gri ∈
Gri =1 {i has at least one substance user friend of peer group r moving away between
two waves},a n dtri ∈ Tri = {0,1}. This includes the following cases: (1) moved to
diﬀerent tract but within the same county; (2) moved to diﬀerent county but within
the same state; (3) moved to diﬀerent state. In this two-group-two-period setting, if
there is no interaction eﬀects between time and group, i.e., the change of outcomes
in the control group over time can oﬀer a counterfactual for the treated group in the
absence of treatment, then the second-period “treatment” (relative to the ﬁrst-period
baseline treatment) can be properly deﬁned as Iri = Gri · Tri, or equivalently, the
treatment eﬀect is the second-period treatment relative to the baseline treatment,
Iri =1 {Gri =1 ,T ri =1 }. If the “common trend” assumption is plausible, we require
that the group membership Gri be at least randomly assigned on the peer-group
level conditional on group-level observables, x2r. And, if this “mover” experiment is
randomized at the peer-group level, conditional on peer group level observables, then
peer-group level potential outcomes must be independent of this group membership.
Equivalently, peer group level unobservables can be excluded through diﬀerencing
22based upon this treatment group membership. The observed diﬀerence is therefore
purely due to this membership assignment, and can be seen as the “normal diﬀerence”.
The “abnormal diﬀerence” arises over time will reveal the treatment eﬀect since peer
group level unobserved heterogeneities as confounders have been excluded.
Borrow notation from the potential outcome models (POM):
(24) (y0rt,y 1rt) ⊥ G|x2r,T = t
(25) ⇒ αrt ⊥ G|x2r,T = t
Observed diﬀerence due to group membership assignment is thus not confounded
by group level unobserved heterogeneities. This observed diﬀerence represents a “nor-
mal” or manipulable diﬀerence because it is cleaned from αrt.T h e r e f o r e ,
yrit|αrt,x1ri,x2r,G= g,T = t
(26) ∼ yrit|x1ri,x2r,G= g,T = t
⇒ αrt properly excluded from the outcome
We virtually argue that the diﬀerence between peer-group level unobserved het-
erogeneities averaged by the treatment-control group membership can be observed
as or proxied by a “normal” diﬀerence induced by an exogenous manipulation which
deﬁnes the treated and untreated group in the absence of treatment.
In summary, identiﬁcation of social interactions in this article rests upon a linear-
in-means model and a DID design. We ﬁrst adopt the following linear speciﬁcation,
23and then extend it to a nonlinear setting where the treatment eﬀect can be identiﬁed
through CIC.
However, when the treated and untreated groups do not share a “common” trend,
DID estimate doesn’t have the meaning of treatment eﬀects. This is likely even
under random assignment since either treatment or control group may still experience
diﬀerent transient shocks over time which are not bound to be “common”. In this
case the interaction term between group membership and time indicator only helps
to identify endogenous eﬀects, and τ doesn’t represent the eﬀect from a manipulation
and is not essentially of policy relevance. This limitation in some way results from
the excessively restrictive linear setting. In contrast, CIC permits interactions taking
places between time and diﬀerent quantiles of individual unobservables across groups,
so that counterfactuals in the absence of treatment are not necessarily restricted by
using the expected time trend from the control group as what a conventional DID
requires.
Endogenous eﬀects
Identifying endogenous eﬀects in linear-in-expectations model faces two main chal-
lenges: (1) unobserved heterogeneities; (2) the “reﬂection problem”, namely the
collinearity between exogenous eﬀects and endogenous eﬀects. Without imposing
exclusion restrictions, (2) is impossible to circumvent unless discrete choice models
are studied (Brock and Durlauf 2001). In our study, (2) is resolved by adopting a
linear-in-means model, a model better capturing the nature of interactions. It has
been shown that this model possesses crucial nonlinearities carried out by group sizes
(Davezies, d’Haultfoeuille et al. 2006; Lee 2006). Unless all groups are of the same
size or there is lack of variations in group sizes, where numerical problems arises due to
24ill-conditioned observation matrices, disentangling endogenous eﬀects from exogenous
eﬀects is generically feasible even when all members of the group are not observed.
Add Health provides valuable information in regard to friendship networks, sizes
of peer groups and their variations. Given its study design, the composition of peer
groups is directly surveyed, which, to a large extent, minimizes the measurement
error and satisﬁes a prerequisite to linear-in-means models that the group size must
be known. Table 2 provides details, from which we can see that these social reference
groups are unanimously small in size. Nearly 90% of these groups consist of no more
than three students. Considering the nature of these groups, interactions among
closest friends are presumably inﬂuential and meaningful. In addition, small-group
interactions are better suitable to linear-in-means models because with the case of
large groups, “identiﬁcation can be weak in the sense that the estimates converge in
distribution at low rates.” (Lee 2006).
Now consider how this DID approach assists identiﬁcation of endogenous eﬀects
when treatment group assignment is independent of peer group-level unobserved het-
erogeneities conditional on certain peer group level observables:















This double diﬀerencing procedure will result in:














2rjλ2 + τ +e  ri
where e s ≡ (s11 − s10) − (s01 − s00) and sgt ≡ s|G=g,T=t.
25Use a matrix representation:
(29) e yr = λ0Wre yr + e X1rλ1 + Wr e X2rλ2 + ιmrτ +e ²r




































































As (30) demonstrates, identifying λ0 is not possible without additional exclusion
restrictions, say λ2 =0 , which is often imposed by empirical studies.
Instead, now consider a within-group estimator:
Jre yr = λ0JrWre yr + JrX1rλ1 + JrWrX2rλ2 + Jrιmrτ + Jre ²r
Jre yr = −
λ0
mr − 1
Jre yr + JrX1rλ1 −
1
mr − 1



























λ2 +( e ²r −e ²r)
(32)
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It is clearly seen that the group size transforms a linear-in-means, which is linear
in parameters, model into a nonlinear (in parameters) one that can be generically
26identiﬁed under certain regularity conditions established in Davezies, d’Haultfoeuille
et al. (2006). This model can be estimated by CML or 2SLS (Lee 2006) in principle.
We next focus on the role for the constant (intercept) τ, which “normalizes” the
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We have the following properties:
(33) (1) M0ιN = ι
0
NM0 =0







27(35) (3) M0Wy = Wy − ιNy
Now consider applying a “de-mean” operator to all peer groups:
e y = λ0We y + e X1λ1 + W e X2λ2 + ιNτ +e ²
M0e y = λ0M0We y + M0 e X1λ1 + M0W e X2λ2 + M0ιNτ + M0e ²
e y − ιNe y = λ0(We y − ιNe y)+(e X1 − e X1)λ1 +( W e X2 − ιN e X2)λ2 +( e ² − ιNe  )
⇒ e y =( 1− λ0)(I − λ0W)
−1ιNe y +( I − λ0W)
−1( e X1 − e X1)λ1 + (36)
(I − λ0W)
−1(W e X2 − ιN e X2)λ2 +( I − λ0W)
−1(e ² − ιNe  )
This “de-mean” operator generating a nonlinearity in parameters, similar to Lee
(2006), introduced by group sizes mr’s oﬀers necessary conditions for identifying λ0.
Up to this stage, (36) is estimable via CML or 2SLS, which demands either distribu-
tional assumptions or valid instruments.
However, considering this DID design feature, if “white” noise exists, then we
can estimate this linear-in-means model in the same spirit as we do in a spatial
autoregressive model (SAR). Based on our previous arguments, confounding factors
are controlled in a “ﬁxed” eﬀect manner, rather than resorting to “random” eﬀects,
which is essentially a trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst-order and second-order heterogeneous
responses that we wish to account for. Note that (27) is numerically equivalent to
the following speciﬁcation with individual ﬁxed eﬀects:














2rjtλ2 + τIri + αri + αrt +  rit
28where Iri = GriTri.
If we can accept the presumption that the dependence of yri·’s over time is resolved
by controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects (αri), and the contemporaneous indepen-
dence of yr·t’s is achieved by conditioning on the peer group ﬁxed eﬀect (αrt), then
this model (37), or its equivalence (27), can be estimated without additional exclusion
restrictions. We are hereby restricting the second-order heterogeneities embedded in
the covariance structure in exchange for a ﬂexible control for the ﬁrst-order hetero-
geneities. The gain is less parametric assumptions for the data-generating process
(DGP) at the cost of eﬃciency loss and changing estimand in the presence of het-
erogeneous responses. Acknowledging this trade-oﬀ, we estimate (37) through least
squares to obtain consistent estimates. Given that the conditional variance-covariance
of the disturbances may still possess a “cluster” feature, for robust and valid infer-
ences, we use a block-bootstrap method to account for the clustering and panel data.
Social multipliers
Feedbacks arise from endogenous eﬀects. Such potential “ripple eﬀects” are of policy
interest because the impact of certain intervention will be magniﬁed, which bears rich
implication for a beneﬁt-cost evaluation. Rewrite the econometric speciﬁcation (27)
in a matrix representation.
(38) y = λ0Wy + X1λ1 + WX2λ2 + τI+ βT + γG+ ²










































29Take the expectation condition on I =1and I =0respectively.
E(y|I =1 ) = λ0E(y|I =1 )+E(x1)
0λ1 + E(x2)
0λ2 + τ (40)
E(y|I =0 ) = λ0E(y|I =0 )+E(x1)
0λ1 + E(x2)
0λ2 (41)
Rearrange the diﬀerence between (40) and (41), we obtain a social multiplier
deﬁned as:
(42) social multiplier ≡ E(y|I =1 )− E(y|I =0 )=
τ
1 − λ0
If “common trend” assumption in the DID literature between the treated and un-
treated group can be accepted, speciﬁcally, a “mover” intervention does not introduce
additional confounding factors to the treatment group, and both groups experience
similar changes between wave I and wave II of Add Health’s survey periods, then τ
bears the meaning of treatment eﬀects which corresponds to removing a drug-user
friend from a peer group. Furthermore, if this “mover” intervention is randomly as-
signed, then τ represents an average treatment eﬀects (ATE); otherwise, τ can be
only interpreted as the average eﬀect of treatment on the treated group (ATT) un-
der the “common trend” assumption and in the presence of heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects. If feedbacks are taken into account, then on an aggregate level, the expected
mean outcomes will be changed by an overall treatment eﬀect which is magniﬁed by
1/(1 − λ0) thanks to social interactions.
In order to obtain the full strength of such a social multiplier, we need to identify
τ apart from λ0.
30Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) v.s. Changes-in-changes (CIC)
The essence of these two double diﬀerencing approaches is to extract information
about what would have happened to treatment group in the absence of the treatment
from the control group. DID fails in the situation when there is an interaction between
the treated group and the time period during which the treatment takes place (Meyer
1995). One way out of this threat is to select the control group as similar as possible
to the treated group so that such an interaction is unlikely to happen.
Standard or conventional DID model treats time and group symmetrically. CIC
allows for asymmetric impact from time and group, and therefore can deal with het-
erogeneous treatment eﬀe c t sw h i c hr e m a i nu n d e rr a n d o m i z a t i o n .I nc o n t r a s tt oD I D ,
CIC focuses on the distributions of outcomes, and is able to identify counterfactual
distributions of what could have happened in absence of treatment and in presence of
treatment (Athey and Imbens 2006). In this sense, CIC takes into account endoge-
nous treatment selection based on anticipated incremental beneﬁt of policy, which
also provides a method to evaluate “optimal” policy adoption. In this article, we
ﬁrst obtain a DID estimate as a baseline, since standard DID is still able to identify
homogeneous treatment eﬀect. And then we apply the CIC estimator proposed by
Athey and Imbens (2006) to address the following limitation inherited in the DID
approach.
First, DID accommodates the ﬁrst-order heterogeneities, but it ignores the eﬀects
of unobservables which can change over time, and therefore the mean-variance trade-
oﬀ is neglected as well. Instead, CIC can separately identify the eﬀects of treatment
on the treated and the control group, which allows for much richer policy implications.
Second, if expected (mean) time trend diﬀers between the treated and untreated
groups at the time of pre-treatment or post-treatment, standard DID doesn’t work. In
31contrast, CIC relaxes the common trend assumption by only requiring the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneities stays the same over time in the absence of treatment
and by accommodating the interactions between time and quantiles of distributions
of unobservables in both treated and untreated groups.
Third, conventional DID rules out certain heterogeneous eﬀect due to its linearity
and additivity restrictions. CIC works out in nonlinear settings by taking advantage of
a monotonicity assumption of the latent production functions mapping unobservables
to potential outcomes. It utilizes the relative ranking of pre-treatment outcomes
in the treated group in reference to outcomes of the control group, and calculates
t h et i m ee ﬀect according to that relative ranking. Therefore CIC allows diﬀerent
individuals in treated group have diﬀe r e n tt i m ee ﬀects, and exploits the distribution
of time eﬀects to construct counterfactual distributions. In this sense, CIC considers
the heterogeneities in time eﬀects which is ignored by DID. And, DID assumes a
h o m o g e n e o u st i m ee ﬀects that everyone, on average, experiences the same time trend.
In addition, CIC ﬁts application with short time periods where compositions of
treatment-control groups stay the same. Add Health again provides an excellent
environment thanks to its longitudinal design and two waves of surveys conducted
successively.
In the following section, we ﬁrst estimate τ under conventional DID assumptions.
Next we apply the CIC approach to identify τ under weaker conditions, which is
also an eﬀort to robustify the DID estimate. In the end, we compare the inference
properties regarding these two estimators in terms of size and power.
Adjusting for covariates can be done either parametrically or nonparametrically.
We hereby follows the procedure proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006), which can
be seen as a semiparametric approach–adjusting for covariates parametrically and
identifying the treatment eﬀect nonparametrically. The idea is illustrated in the
32following.















2rjtλ2 + τGriTri + βTri + γGri +  rit
We uses its equivalence as the parametric speciﬁcation.
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ri|Gri = g,Tri = t
e yrigt
d ∼ yri|Gri = g,Tri = t
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d ∼ uri|Gri = g
g ∈ {0,1},t∈ {0,1}
So (43) can be rewritten as:















33DID identiﬁes τ as τDID
ATE under regularity conditions and in the presence of het-
erogeneous treatment eﬀects.
Under CIC’s regularity conditions, the eﬀect of treatment on the treated group is
identiﬁed by CIC as:
(47) τ
CIC
ATT = E(e y11 − e y
N
11)=E(e y11) − E[F
−1
h y,01(Fh y,00(e y10))]
Similarly, the eﬀect of treatment on the control group is identiﬁed by the following:
(48) τ
CIC
ATC = E(e y
I
01 − e y01)=E[F
−1
h y,11(Fh y,10(e y00))] − E(e y01)
The consistency and asymptotic normality of this covariance-adjusted estimator
is established by Athey and Imbens (2006).
Estimation
Our empirical study is focused on adolescents’ substance use, namely illegal drugs,
where peer’s inﬂuence is believed to play a key role in shaping individual’s behav-
ior. To explore peer eﬀects among health-related behaviors, Add Health data have
been deemed well-suited in many respects due to its longitudinal design and speciﬁc
measures of peer groups. Several studies have examined adolescents’ risky behavior,
such as substance use, in relation to their peers’ behavior (Alexander, Piazza et al.
2001; Bauman, Carver et al. 2001; Haynie 2002; Eisenberg 2004; Clark and Loheac
2005) and have found endogenous eﬀects to be compelling or “large enough to be
policy-relevant” (Eisenberg 2004).
Following our brief overview of Add Health, we construct a sample based on mul-
tiple datasets from wave I and wave II: in-home interview, parent interview, in-school
34interview, in-school and in-home friendship nominations, friends network, neighbor-
hood and contextual databases.
Data
Add Health Study is a nationally representative, probability-based survey of adoles-
cents in grades 7 through 12 in the United States. Wave I interviews were conducted
in the 1994-95 school year. A total number of 14,396 adolescents was interviewed.
Wave II data collection includes follow-up in-home interviews with adolescents and
follow-up school administrator interviews conducted in 1996. The second wave sur-
veyed 13,568 students one year after wave I. The sample for the wave II in-home
interview comprised the respondents to the wave I in-home interview, with the fol-
lowing exceptions (cited from “Add Health Design Focus”, UNC Carolina Population
Center):
• “Respondents who were in the 12th grade at wave I and who were not part of
the genetic sample were not interviewed at wave II.”
• “Respondents who were in only the wave I disabled sample were not re-interviewed.”
• “An additional 65 adolescents who were members of the genetic sample and
who had not been interviewed at wave I were recruited at wave II.”
Wave II interviews took place from April through August 1996. The interviews
were generally identical to the ones conducted in wave I, which allows us to use a
subsample from these two-wave surveys and construct a two-period panel dataset that
is relevant to our empirical study.
Studies on children and adolescents’ problem behaviors have reported indicators
for perception to be important explanatory variables (Smetters and Gravelle 2001).
35I choose not to include such variables because of the potential endogeneity. Table
1 gives summary statistics and variable deﬁnitions. It is noticeable that the times
of illegal drug use per month on average have gone up by nearly 30% between wave
I and wave II as students are getting older. Meanwhile, the variance increases by
about 358%! So, a simple conjecture of a “mean” shift of drug use between these
two survey periods will not be consistent with this giant increase in the variations
of drug use. One possible explanation to this rests upon social interactions, which
can generate “excess” variance of between-group variations relative to within-group
variations (Graham 2006). Peer’s inﬂuence also appear to be more prominent as
adolescents age in this longitudinal setting.
A, probably, most rare feature of Add Health compared to other similar longi-
tudinal studies on youth’s behavior, is that adolescents (respondents) were asked to
nominate up to ﬁve close male and ﬁve close female friends from the school roster.
Friends’ identiﬁcation numbers make it possible to link a respondent’s information to
his or her friends’ and therefore construct a relevant and meaningful peer group. This
gives us potential advantages over many empirical studies in which peer eﬀects are
merely evaluated based upon either broadly or hypothetically deﬁned reference group
where actual interactions are likely to be overstated. Table 2 lists the variations of
these peer groups’ sizes. As we discussed later, such small group sizes with suﬃcient
variations ﬁt right in linear-in-means models (Lee 2006).
Mover experiment
Identiﬁcation of the endogenous eﬀect in this article hinges upon an exogenous per-
turbation of peer groups, which generates an observed diﬀerence between the treated
and untreated group. This diﬀerence is manipulable in the sense of group level unob-
served heterogeneities being purged of conditional on certain observables which are
36not directly aﬀe c t e db ys u c ha ni n t e r v e n t i o n ,a n dt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fw h i c hs t a y si n -
variant in both pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. This is in line with the
idea of “selection on observables”.
Add Health provides a plausibly exogenous changes, a quasi-experiment, in peer
environment given its longitudinal design–a friend who is a substance user moving
away in between wave I and wave II. This brings up the following essential question:
if in period 0 (T =0 ) A and B are identical in observable characteristics and both of
them have a friend who uses (illegal) drugs, then why does A use fewer (illegal) drugs
than B in period 1 (T =1 ) if A’s friend who is a substance user moves away in between
these two periods (G =1 ) while B’s friend doesn’t (G =0 )? This quasi-experiment
shares the same idea of a policy intervention which removes a substance user from
his or her peer group. If this “mover friend” experiment takes place exogenously on
the peer group level conditional on group level observables, then the diﬀerence in
outcomes between the treated group (G =1 )a n dt h eu n t r e a t e dg r o u p( G =0 )i n
the pre-treatment period (T =0 ) can be interpreted as a “normal” diﬀerence. In the
post-treatment period (T =1 ), the diﬀerence between the treatment (G =1 )a n d
control (G =0 ) group will include this “normal diﬀerence” plus the treatment eﬀect,
which is essentially the eﬀect of the second-period treatment (I ≡ G·T =1 )r e l a t i v e
to the baseline treatment (I =0 ). Therefore, a random intervention, conditional
on group level observables, will eliminate unobserved heterogeneities which confound
endogenous eﬀect and provides a DID estimate. Whether this DID estimate can be
interpreted as a treatment eﬀect estimate depends upon the randomness of the in-
tervention. We can also look at this DID approach from the other perspective. For
the untreated group (G =0 ), its diﬀerence between period 0 (T =0 )a n dp e r i o d1
(T =1 ) represents a “common trend” whose validity, still, depends on the (condi-
tional) random assignment of the treatment. Note that such a “common trend” is
37not testable with two periods, which can be tested with multiple periods. Consid-
ering the treated group (G =1 ), its counterfactual state–outcomes in the absence
of treatment–will be constructed by this “common trend”, so that the diﬀerence
between period 0 (T =0 )a n dp e r i o d1( T =1 ) subtracting the “common trend” will
reveal the treatment eﬀect. In this way, DID eliminates individual heterogeneities,
such as preference and ability, which are possibly time-invariant, through the diﬀer-
encing over time and purges group heterogeneities via a second diﬀerencing across
groups. This DID idea, later extended to CIC, is illustrated in table 3.
Table 3 provides a primitive description of how things have changed over two
periods. We observe that for the treated group drug use on average dropped dramat-
ically in comparison with the control group. And, the “normal diﬀerence” between
these two experimental groups has been even reversed. Regression analysis of this
primitive ﬁndings help to disentangle eﬀects of certain attributes, which do not bear
causal meanings (Holland 1986), and eﬀects due to things which are manipulable and
whose causal interpretation is therefore valid. Of these, we are interested in separately
identifying endogenous and contextual eﬀects. From the observation of table 1 and
table 3, the role for endogenous interactions is emerging. We notice that observed
characteristics stay stable over time while outcomes have changed, relatively, a lot.
Through a primitive DID analysis, we ﬁnd that there seems to be some important
“unknown factors” that have played a key role in changing the outcomes. Whether
such “unknown factors” can be identiﬁed depends critically on this “mover-friend”
experiment.
Table 4 provides mean-comparison results of evaluating this mover-friend experi-
ment. For this ﬁrst-moment comparison, we cannot ﬁnd suﬃcient “evidence” to con-
clude that these peer group level characteristics are not similar between the treated
and control group in both pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. This, to a cer-
38tain extent, will validate our assumptions, though still not testable, of “selection on
observables”. In addition, these “balanced” characteristics, to some degrees, invali-
date the concern of potential interactions between time and either the treatment or
the control group. Group assignment per se is, empirically shown, to be less likely to
introduce unobserved heterogeneities.
Admitting that such a standard check, i.e. group similarity on observables, cer-
tainly has its own deﬁciency, we next provide further evidence to show that such
exogeneity is hard to refute even though it is still not perfectly believable. Thanks to
Add Health, we obtain information on parents’ intent to move between wave I and
II, which is likely to be correlated with actual “removals” of drug-user friends from
their peer groups. Table 5A and 5B oﬀer statistical evidence for the independence
between the treatment assignment and parents’ intent to move. Two survey questions
answered by parents, who make actual moving decisions, are of particular importance.
One is “how much would you like to move away from this neighborhood?”, and the
other one is “in this neighborhood, how big a problem are drug dealers and drug
users?” Both table 5A and 5B provide no (suﬃcient) evidence to reject the hypothe-
sis that the treatment assignment is independent of parents’ intent to move in terms
of Pearson χ2 and Kendall’s rank correlation coeﬃcient.
Table 5A reveals the fact that for those who wanted “very much” to move out
of their current neighborhood at wave I, 1.9% of them were actually “assigned” to
the treatment group. For those who didn’t want to move “at all”, 1% of them were
assigned to receive the “treatment”. In addition, within the treatment group, there
are 44.9% of the teenagers having parents who didn’t want to move “at all”, 34.7%
having parents who had “some” intent to move and only 20.4% of the students whose
parents wanted to move “very much”.
Similarly, table 5B shows that for those who regard the drug dealer and drug user
39“a big problem”, none of them were actually “assigned” to the treatment group. For
those who didn’t care “at all”, 1.3% of them were assigned to receive the “treatment”.
In addition, within the treatment group, there are 61.2% of the teenagers having
parents who didn’t think drug dealer and drug user a problem “at all” and 38.8% of
the students whose parents only believed “some” drug problems existing in current
neighborhoods.
Table 6 further reveals the relationship between families’ actual residential choice
and their moving pattern. We observe that primary reasons for choosing current
neighborhoods, in descending order, are: “aﬀordable good housing”, “close to friends
or relatives”, “better schools” and “less crime”. For those who place priority on “bet-
ter school”, 85.7% of those families didn’t move, and for those who care about “less
crime”, 89.3% stay put. It is also shown that the primary residential changes were
made by families who placed “aﬀordable good housing” on the ﬁrst place. There-
fore, considering the facts in table 5A, 5B and table 6, parental choice of residential
neighborhood, in ideal situations possibly depending upon peer groups’ behavior, is
unlikely to be correlated with such a speciﬁc “mover friend” experiment during this
particular period between wave I and wave II. Parents can have good intent to choose
best neighborhoods for children, but there are real world constraints that could make
“accidental” or unplanned or even undesirable moving happen, which essentially pro-
vides valuable exogenous changes from a research perspective.
Estimator
Based upon our discussion about the advantages of CIC over DID, we use the following
estimators proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006) for the eﬀect of treatment on the
treated and on the control groups respectively. The estimate from DID is used as a
baseline, or can be interpreted as an average treatment eﬀect under DID’s regularity
40conditions.
Observations obtained from (44) group g and time period t are denoted by e ygt,k(ri),
for r =1 ,···,R, i =1 ,···,m r and k =1 ,···,N gt.W eu s et h ee m p i r i c a ld i s t r i b u t i o n
as an estimator for the distribution function.





1{e ygt,k(ri) 6 y}
The estimator for the inverse of the distribution function is given by:
(50) b F
−1
h y,gt(q)=i n f {y ∈ e Ygt,k(ri)|b Fh y,gt(y) > q}
































Estimation results on adolescents’ drug use under a social-interactions based model,
given by table 8, are in line with our intuition. Endogenous eﬀects due to peer’s
inﬂuence predominate other eﬀects. It is shown that 61.42% of the increment of peer’s
drug use will be “transferred” to individual’s incremental usage of illegal drugs. This
eﬀect is singled out from contextual eﬀects and is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Given its magnitude, we would expect a large multiplier to come into play when
outside intervention occurs. Less importantly, going to a private school can alleviate
41this drug use problem. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 5% level but it doesn’t contribute
to a multiplier eﬀect. It is also noticeable that a male primary care-giver can lower
the frequency of drug use and male students, on average, have higher potential use
of illegal drugs.
Since treatment and control groups diﬀer in the distribution of individual het-
erogeneities such as preferences, which aﬀects drug use, we may wonder whether the
considered “mover-friend” treatment assignment is “need-based”. An optimal or ideal
policy intervention should be conducted to the group in which adolescents have higher
use of illegal drugs and their parents are worried about such drug problems. Table
7 includes information identical to table 5B except that percentages are calculated.
In both treated and untreated groups, the distribution of parents’ attitude toward
drug problems in current residential neighborhood are similar. As we have previously
argued, such a “mover-friend” experiment is assigned not according to parents’ need.
Since parents make actual moving decision, from individual student’s perspective, this
removal of “substance-user” intervention is randomly assigned. This intervention will
be optimal in the sense that it is conducted directly to the group where high drug
usage is pervasive. Table 3 has veriﬁed this. It is the group in which drug use nearly
four times greater than the other group that did adopt the “treatment”. Under this
optimal policy adoption presumption, we would expect that magnitudes of various
treatment eﬀects identiﬁed by CIC and DID obey the following relationship:
(53) |b τ
CIC
ATC| < |b τ
DID
ATE| < |b τ
CIC
ATT|
Table 9 veriﬁes (53). The point estimates are in accord with our conjecture of this
42optimal policy adoption.
(54) | − 0.240| < | − 1.439| < | − 2.064|
Inference
We make heavy use of bootstrap for inference given that exact ﬁnite-sample results are
unavailable for estimators implemented in this article. Employing bootstrap meth-
ods permit us to draw statistical inference when analytical results, based on limiting
distributions, for standard errors are diﬃcult to compute or asymptotic methods
work poorly in ﬁnite samples. When asymptotically pivotal statistic exists, we use
bootstrap to implement asymptotic reﬁnement, which essentially provides a numeri-
cal method to implement the Edgeworth expansion reducing asymptotic errors from
O(N−1/2) to O(N−1) for one-sided tests and from O(N−1) to O(N−3/2) for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
Finite sample size correction
Finite sample inference based on asymptotic approximation tends to understate the
actual size of testing parameters obtained from a consistent and asymptotically nor-
mal estimator. Taking into account this potential size distortion, we bootstrap stan-
dard errors of estimates of the endogenous eﬀects and various treatment eﬀects. We
use two–percentile and biased-corrected–methods to construct 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals for these estimates.
The estimate of the endogenous eﬀect remains highly signiﬁcant from zero with
smallest ﬁnite sample bias. Although point estimates of various treatment eﬀects give
correct signs, they can not be distinguished from zero statistically at 5% signiﬁcance
43level. However, for the DID estimate, its asymptotically pivotal statistic exists. We
use bootstrap to implement an asymptotic reﬁnement, and obtain its p-value 0.038
in table 10. Therefore, the null hypothesis τDID
ATE > 0 can be rejected at 5% signif-
icance level. Implementing a mandatory policy that removes a substance-user from
a peer group will lower the average frequencies of adolescents’ drug use. Unlike the
DID estimate, CIC estimates of the average eﬀects of treatment on both the treated
and untreated groups do not oﬀer asymptotic reﬁnements. It can be shown that in
general CIC will be less eﬃcient if outcomes in the counterfactual states are more
volatile compared with DID estimates (Athey and Imbens 2006). Nonetheless, both
CIC estimates point to the correct direction. We next bootstrap t-ratios for each
treatment eﬀect, and then use the limiting (normal) distribution to obtain associated
p-values. The result on τCIC
ATC is encouraging. The null hypothesis τCIC
ATC > 0 can now
be rejected with high signiﬁcance level (α 6 1%). Combining the endogenous eﬀect
estimate, we may construct diﬀerent “social multipliers” corresponding to diﬀerent
treatment eﬀects on the basis of (42). We then obtain p-values for these various “so-
cial multipliers”, and the multiplier for the average eﬀect of treatment on the control
group remains highly signiﬁcant (α 6 1%). Under the case of optimal policy adop-
tion, such a multiplier eﬀect for the untreated group which hypothetically received
the treatment may serve as the lower bound of the actual multiplier eﬀect. In our
example, this multiplier eﬀect arising from a hypothetical treatment on the control
group, in magnitude, is 159.07% times greater than the pure average eﬀect of treat-
ment on the untreated group per se. This lower bound is also statistically signiﬁcant
from zero. Given the magnitude order of diﬀerent treatment eﬀects established under
optimal policy adoption, we may hypothesize that multipliers generated by the aver-
age treatment eﬀect and the average eﬀect of treatment on the treated shall be even
more prominent. However, due to limitation of the sample size, there is no enough
44power for us to distinguish these two multipliers from zero. Detailed testing results
are reported in table 10.
Power calculation and inverse power functions
Powers of testing key parameters are reported in table 11. It is only the test for the
endogenous eﬀect that does not fail to reject at least 50% of the time, which is actually
better than ﬂipping a coin to decide the result. None of the tests for treatment eﬀects
possess suﬃcient power. To make valid inference of these hypothesis tests when
the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis, we compute inverse power (IP) functions
to yield summary measures, proposed by Andrews (1989), that can facilitate the
interpretation of the test results.
We use inner IP function to answer questions such as: which deviations from
the null hypothesis have “a good chance” of being undetected by the test. Here “a
good chance” is represented by ﬂipping a coin (with its weight evenly distributed).
Within the range of this inner IP, the power of a test is less than 50%. We also use
outer IP function to answer questions like: which deviations from the null hypothesis
have a very good chance of being detected by the test. Here “a very good chance” is
determined by 1−α. Given a test of size equal to 5%, the outer IP gives the range of
deviations from the null for which the test rejects at least 95% of the time. Loosely
speaking, within the range deﬁned by outer IP, probabilities of making type II errors
are no greater than type I errors, which is the case that we can control type II errors
by limiting type I errors.
Table 11 gives the summary measures of power, inner IP and outer IP. Figure 1
and 2 and 3 illustrate approximated power and inverse power functions. The DID
test maintains superior power to the CIC test for average eﬀect of treatment on the
45treated, but its power is inferior to the CIC test for average eﬀect of treatment on
the control group. Given the directions set by CIC estimates, the inner IP function
of the test for the eﬀect of treatment on the untreated tells us that such a test can
not outperform a coin ﬂip in the parameter region [−0.7899,0], but it is able to reject
t h en u l lh y p o t h e s i sm o r et h a n9 5 %o ft h et i m eo n c et h em a g n i t u d eo ft h el e f t w a r d
deviation from zero reaches 1.4529 given a 5% signiﬁcance level. The low power of
the test for average eﬀect of treatment on the treated is mostly due to the modest
sample size, which limits meaningful inference. However, under the case of optimal
policy adoption, the average eﬀect of the treatment on the untreated group sets a
lower bound with adequate power, which still conveys useful information that such a
“social multiplier” generated by hypothetically removing a substance-user from peer
groups is still too large to be overlooked and it is well worth attention to policy
makers, researchers, health-care providers and educators for better understanding of
how to protect young people and secure our future.
Conclusion
It is widely believed that adolescents’ behaviors, particularly heath-related ones, are
easily inﬂuenced by others, especially by their friends, during this rapid transition pe-
riod from children to adults. It is also acknowledged that teenage behaviors and their
health outcomes will not be well understood without considering social interactions.
Finding a strong correlation in behavior among peers cannot justify the existence of
peer eﬀects. The impact of friends on an individual’s behavior will be confounded by
their mutual inﬂuences, individual’s self-selection into peer groups and peer’s shared
unobserved environmental factors. I confront these problems by modeling the nature
of interactions, exploring exogenous variations of peer groups and taking advantage
46of the longitudinal design provided by Add Health.
Using Add Health, I identify and estimate peer eﬀects of adolescents’ health-
related behaviors–substance use–through diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID), using time-
diﬀerencing to exclude individual “ﬁxed eﬀect” and treatment-control-diﬀerencing to
exclude peer group level unobserved heterogeneities. To accommodate possible be-
haviors of sorting into treatment–the group with higher expected gain receiving
the treatment–I estimate such heterogeneous treatment eﬀects based on changes-in-
changes (CIC), a generalized version of DID.
To isolate peer eﬀects from other factors, my linear-in-means modeling strategy
rests upon a spatial autoregressive model. Notice that adolescents spend more time
with their closest friends. As to substance use, it is more likely that observed actions
of just being “cool” or actual “pursuits” of happiness seen from peers, rather than
expected behaviors, that inﬂuence individual decision-making. In this sense, the
linear-in-means model is more appropriate and therefore adopted. This distinguishes
my study from current empirical studies on social interactions, most of which are
based on linear-in-expectations models. Resolving the “reﬂection problem” (Manski
1993) under linear-in-means models has been discussed by Lee (2006). The necessary
condition for variations in peer group sizes is well satisﬁed by Add Health data.
To combat unobserved group heterogeneities, I explore a source of exogenous
variations in peers’ drug use, a “treatment” induced by a friend, who is a substance
user, moving away between wave I and II from his or her own peer group. Such a
removal, due to, for example, parents’ job change, is likely to be independent of peer
group level unobserved heterogeneities conditional on a suﬃcient number of group-
level observable characteristics (generously available in Add Health). This quasi-
experimental like change shares a similar nature of a policy intervention which removes
drug user friends from a peer group. Since individual preference for peer group
47formation can be reasonably assumed time-invariant in the short period between Add
Health’s ﬁrst two survey periods, this sorting behavior is explicitly controlled for in a
“ﬁxed eﬀect” manner under Add Health’s longitudinal design. This strategy allows
for identifying not only peer eﬀects, but also the treatment eﬀect corresponding to a
hypothetical policy intervention of removing a drug-user friend from his or her own
peer group. Identiﬁcation of these two parameters ultimately leads to constructing
a “social multiplier”, which bears rich policy implication, especially seen from an
economic perspective.
Inferences on the endogenous eﬀect and various treatment eﬀects are conducted
through bootstrap, which is currently underutilized. We correct the size and compute
the power of testing these parameters of policy interest. We also utilize inverse power
summary measure to facilitate interpretation and make valid inference when tests fail
to reject the null hypothesis, as an eﬀort to address the weak state of inference in
empirical studies.
Exploring the nature of peer eﬀects and measuring the associated “social mul-
tiplier” is very relevant. It is well worth attention to policy makers, researchers,
health-care providers and educators for better understanding of how to protect young
people and thereby secure our future.
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52Table 1. Summary Statistics and Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable Wave I Wave II
mean std. deviation N mean std. deviation N
Individual behavior
Drug use 0.7208 6.900 3922 0.9296 14.7686 3922
Individual characteristics
Age 15.2404 1.5313 3922 16.1629 1.5568 3922
Male 0.4776 0.4996 3922 0.4776 0.4996 3922
White 0.6311 0.4826 3922 0.6311 0.4826 3922
Black 0.2035 0.4026 3922 0.2035 0.4026 3922
Grade 9.3383 1.4548 3922 10.2906 1.4571 3878
Private School 0.0750 0.2634 3920 0.0750 0.2634 3920
Church 0.5681 0.4954 3855 0.5263 0.4994 3825
Allowance 7.4447 10.5153 3922 8.2449 12.4101 3920
Family factors
Household income 45.7944 50.8590 3706 45.7944 50.8590 3706
PCG’s education 0.1399 0.3469 3868 0.1399 0.3469 3868
Spouse’s education 0.1330 0.3397 3405 0.1330 0.3397 3405
PCG (male) 0.0734 0.2608 3842 0.0734 0.2608 3842
Contextual factors
Median income (block) 31797.09 14784.62 3905 31755.62 14934.85 3899
Education (block) 0.2190 0.1388 3922 0.2196 0.1397 3917
Unemployment rate (block) 0.0761 0.0516 3913 0.0758 0.0510 3903
Urban 0.4850 0.4998 3922 0.4881 0.4999 3917
Friends’ averaged characteristics
Grade 9.3383 1.4541 3922 10.3238 1.5779 3890
Church 0.5706 0.4934 3876 0.5258 0.4976 3850
Household income 46.7665 52.4584 3767 467665 52.4584 3767
PCG’s education 0.1402 0.3441 3875 0.1402 0.3441 3875
Spouse’s education 0.1356 0.3334 3531 0.1356 0.3334 3531
Moved between wave I and II
Mover 0.1119 0.3153 3922 0.1119 0.3153 3922
Note:
1. “drug use”: during the past 30 days, how many times have you used illegal (marijuana, cocaine, inhalants,
LSD, PCP, ecstasy and heroin) drugs (0-900 times)
2. “grade”: what grade are/were you in (grade 7-12, 13 beyond high school)
3. “church”: ever go (=1) to church or not (=0)
4. “allowance”: how much is your allowance each week ($0-$95)
5. “income”: about how much total income before taxes did your family receive in 1994 (in thousands)
6. “PCG’s education”: primary care-giver graduated from college/university
537. “median income (block)”: block median household income ($49,999-$148,752)
8. “education (block)”: within block proportion of population aged 25 and above with college degree or higher
(0.000 to 0.944)
9. “unemployment rate”: within block unemployment rate (0.000 to 0.593)
10. “mover”: respondent moved to a diﬀerent census tract between wave I and II. This includes the following
cases: (1) moved to diﬀerent tract but within the same county; (2) moved to diﬀerent county but within the same
state; (3) moved to diﬀerent state.
54Table 2. Variations of Peer-Group Sizes
Sizes of Peer-Groups Frequency Percentage
2 1088 69.21
3 324 20.61
48 5 5 .41
53 7 2 .35
62 1 1 .34
71 3 0 .83
84 0 .25
Total 1572 100
Table 3. A Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Analysis without Covariates
drug use (mean) T =0 T =1 diﬀerence
G =0 0 .6808 (N00 = 3872) 0.9396 (N01 = 3872) 0.2588 (“common trend”)
G =1 3 .8200 (N10 =5 0 ) 0.1600 (N11 =5 0 ) −3.6600
diﬀerence 3.1392 (“normal diﬀerence”) −0.7796 −3.9188 (“treatment eﬀect”)
Note:
1. T:W a v eI( T =0 ), Wave II (T =1 ).
2. G: binary indicator (=1) for the “mover-treatment” group.
3. “mover-treatment”: a substance user friend moved away between Wave I and II.
55Table 4. Evaluating “Mover-Friend” Quasi-Experiment — Mean Comparison
Treatment-Control Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Comparison mean std.error t mean std.error t
Individual characteristics
White 0.0638 0.1275 0.50 0.0644 0.1268 0.51
Black 0.0182 0.1049 0.17 0.0303 0.1042 0.29
private school −0.0508 0.0654 −0.78 −0.0533 0.0657 −0.81
allowance 3.4888 2.8199 1.24 −5.6031 3.3772 −1.66
Contextual factors
median income (block) −1053.872 3653.922 −0.29 −2078.014 3621.189 −0.57
college education (block) 0.0087 0.0342 0.25 0.0501 0.0344 1.46
unemployment rate (block) −0.0114 0.0133 −0.86 0.0020 0.0130 0.15
urban −0.0381 0.1325 −0.29 −0.0146 0.1321 −0.11
Note: The “mover-friend” quasi-experiment is randomly assigned conditional on the following peer-group level
averaged characteristics: age, sex, grade, religion, household income, primary care-giver’s education, spouse’s educa-
tion.
56Table 5A. Evaluating the Independence between “Mover-Friend” and Parents’ Intent to
Move
“Want to Move” at Wave I
not at all (=1) some (=2) very much (=3) Total
“Mover-Friend” between G = 0 2106 1195 518 3819
Wave I and Wave II G = 1 22 17 10 49
Total 2128 1212 528 3868
Note:
1. The survey question is: “how much would you like to move away from this neighborhood?”
2. Pearson χ2 =2 .7625,P r o b .=0 .251; Kendall’s τ-b =0 .0248, Asy.std.error =0 .016, z =1 .55
Table 5B. Evaluating the Independence between “Mover-Friend” and Parents’ Intent to
Move
“How big the drug problem is” at Wave I
not at all (=1) small (=2) a big problem (=3) Total
“Mover Friend” between G = 0 2295 1201 313 3809
Wave I and Wave II G = 1 30 19 0 49
Total 2325 1220 313 3858
Note:
1. The survey question is: “in this neighborhood, how big a problem are drug dealers and drug users?”
2. Pearson χ2 =4 .8371,P r o b .=0 .089; Kendall’s τ-b = −0.0090, Asy.std.error =0 .014, z = −0.64
57Table 6. Family Residential Choice and Moving Pattern
“Why live Moved between Wave I and Wave II
here?” no same block same tract same county same state diﬀ. state unknown Total
1 51 0 0 0 0 0 1 52
2 294 8 0 20 6 0 7 335
3 302 0 2 25 7 1 8 345
4 621 7 4 54 22 1 11 720
5 465 0 0 34 7 10 5 521
6 185 0 0 10 1 5 5 206
7 510 6 7 32 15 1 11 582
8 481 2 3 40 19 6 10 561
9 49 0 0 0 1 0 0 50
10 224 0 0 4 2 5 1 236
Total 3182 23 16 219 80 29 59 3608
Notes on “why live here”:
1 = near old workplace; 2 = near current workplace; 3 = had outgrown previous housing; 4 = aﬀordable good
housing; 5 = less crime; 6 = less illegal activity; 7 = close to friends or relatives; 8 = better schools; 9 = children of
appropriate ages; 10 = born here.
Table 7. Optimal Policy Implication
“How big the drug problem is” at Wave I
not at all (=1) small (=2) a big problem (=3) Total



























58Table 8. Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DID) Estimates
drug use coeﬃcient std. error t
“mover friend” treatment
G · T =1 −1.4385 1.4763 −0.97
peer’s average behavior
drug use 0.6142∗∗∗ 0.2035 3.02
individual characteristics
age 0.0639 0.0908 0.70
male 0.4497∗ 0.2477 1.82
White −1.1125 0.4287 −0.26
Black −0.3568 0.3169 −1.13
grade −0.1139 1.0479 −0.11
private school −0.3356∗∗ 0.1629 −2.06
church 1.3052 0.9573 1.36
allowance −0.0005 0.0121 −0.04
family factors
household income 0.0006 0.0007 0.85
PCG’s college education 0.1457 0.2197 0.66
spouse’s college education 0.2155 0.2720 0.79
PCG (male) −0.3097∗ 0.1786 −1.73
contextual factors
median income (block) 0.00001 8.77e − 06 1.18
college education (block) −2.9744∗∗ 1.4391 −2.07
unemployment rate (block) −4.0280 2.9738 −1.35
urban 0.4491∗ 0.2343 1.92
peer’s average characteristics
grade −0.1320 1.0598 −0.12
church −0.9518 0.9705 −0.98
household income 0.0007 0.0012 0.61
PCG’s college education −0.0383 0.1895 −0.20




number of observations = 6335
number of clusters = 3231
Notes: Asterisks (e.g., *, **, ***) denote signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clusters. Cluster-robust standard errors are calculated based on random eﬀects in
the panel setting.
59Table 9. Changes-in-Changes (CIC) and Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DID) Estimates







observed coeﬃcient −2.064 −0.240 −1.4385 0.614
bias −1.050 0.043 0.1112 0.023
bootstrap standard error 4.789 0.285 1.5308 0.198
95% conﬁdence interval (percentile) [−16.47,1.771] [−0.836,0.315] [−4.2929,1.7931] [0.247,0.936]
95% conﬁdence interval (bias-corrected) [−18.35,1.490] [−1.117,0.156] [−4.6069,1.3087] [0.206,0.931]
Notes: Block-bootstraps are implemented in this panel setting with clustered data. Resample is done over blocks,
jointly deﬁned by individual student and his or her peer group.
Table 10. Testing Treatment Eﬀects and Social Multipliers
Hypothesis testing bootstrap w/ asy. reﬁnement bootstrap w/o asy. reﬁnement
treatment (τ) t percentile-tp -value t normal p-value
H0 : τ > 0 τDID
ATE −0.970 0.038 −0.940 0.174
H1 : τ<0 τCIC
ATT −− − 0.300 0.382
τCIC
ATC −− − 5.052 0.000
multiplier (Mτ) t percentile-tp -value t normal p-value
H0 : Mτ > 0 MτDID
ATE −− − 0.467 0.320
H1 : Mτ < 0 MτCIC
ATT −− − 0.147 0.442
MτCIC
ATC −− − 2.533 0.006
Notes: Block-bootstraps are implemented in this panel setting with clustered data. Resample is done over blocks,
jointly deﬁned by individual student and his or her peer group.
Table 11. Approximated Powers and Inverse Powers
α =0 .05 Power Inner Inverse Power Outer Inverse Power
H0 : λ0 =0 0 .5921 [−0.5488,0.5488] (−∞,−1.0094] ∪ [1.0094,∞)
H0 : τDID
ATE =0 0 .1019 [−4.2428,4.2428] (−∞,−7.8040] ∪ [7.8040,∞)
H0 : τCIC
ATT =0 0 .0610 [−13.273,13.273] (−∞,−24.414] ∪ [24.414,∞)
H0 : τCIC
ATC =0 0 .0915 [−0.7899,0.7899] (−∞,−1.4529] ∪ [1.4529,∞)




















Figure 1. Approximated power and inverse power functions of testing the endogenous eﬀect
(λ0)





















Figure 2. Approximated power and inverse power functions of testing the average eﬀect of
treatment on the treated group(τATT)





















Figure 3. Approximated power and inverse power functions of testing the average eﬀect of
treatment on the control group (τATC)
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